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REAFFIRMING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME
OF “GLOBAL” ARMED CONFLICT
Jonathan Horowitz
ABSTRACT
A notion that there exists under international law the possibility of a
“global” or “transnational” non-international armed conflict (or “global
NIAC”) rests on the assertion that a state that is party to a NIAC may use the
law of armed conflict (LOAC) to target an enemy fighter anywhere he or she
goes in the world. If true, a global NIAC may permit a state to lawfully drop a
bomb on an enemy fighter who sits for a coffee in the middle of a peaceful city,
say London, Rabat, or Hong Kong. Amongst a series of concerns this Essay
highlights, a global NIAC would also permit, under the LOAC principle of
proportionality, incidental civilian harm and destruction of civilian property. A
global NIAC makes war omnipresent and forever looming. These
consequences are unsettling and require a serious evaluation to determine if
international law does in fact permit such an expansive understanding of war.
Utilizing the public international law of interstate use of force, human rights,
and LOAC, this Essay concludes that the concept of a global NIAC cannot
exist without there being a violation of international law, although notably the
violation that this Essay focuses on is that of the territorial state rather than
the attacking state. This does not mean that a state cannot respond to attacks
and threats from non-state groups abroad. It means that concepts other than a
global NIAC must be relied upon to justify extraterritorial use of force.



Legal Officer, Open Society Justice Initiative, jonathan.horowitz@opensocietyfoundations.org. This
Essay was written in the author’s personal capacity and appeared in a longer version in THEORETICAL
BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens David Ohlin ed., forthcoming). The author
thanks Ralph Mamiya, Naz Modirzadeh, Jens David Ohlin, Andrea Prasow, Christopher Rogers, and Gabor
Rona for their comments and Harshani Dharmadasa and Alex Porter for their research assistance. All errors
remain his own.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay assesses the impact that international human rights law has on
the legality of what has been called a global non-international armed conflict
(“global NIAC”). A global NIAC is based on the premise that a state that is
party to a NIAC may use the law of armed conflict (LOAC, also known as
international humanitarian law) to target an enemy fighter with lethal force
anywhere he or she goes in the world. John O. Brennan, when serving as
Assistant to the United States President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, articulated the notion of a global NIAC when he stated that
the United States was in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and
associated forces and “[t]here is nothing in international law that . . . prohibits
us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield,
at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take
action against the threat.”1
Here, to better demonstrate what a global NIAC permits, is a hypothetical:
The state of Arcadia is engaged in a NIAC with a rebel group on the
territory of Desmonda. A rebel sub-commander boards a plane in Desmonda
and travels to Franconia, which is a country that is not engaged in any armed
conflict and is located thousands of miles from Arcadia and Desmonda.
In Franconia, the sub-commander plans to meet with various arms dealers
and will determine from which of them he will purchase dozens of rocket
propelled grenades, hundreds of AK-47s, and components for improvised
explosive devises. The sub-commander plans to use those weapons in his
armed conflict with Arcadia. Franconia’s intelligence service learns that the
sub-commander is within its territory and informs Arcadia. Arcadia, in turn,
asks for Franconia’s consent to target the sub-commander using lethal force

1 John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, Speech at
Woodrow Wilson International Center on the Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy,
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-uscounterterrorism-strategy ; see also Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Eric
H. Holder Jr., Att’y Gen., on Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated
Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi 24 (July 16, 2010), http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/
aulaqi.pdf (“[T]he contemplated DoD operation would occur in Yemen, a location that is far from the most
active theater of combat between the United States and al-Qaida. That does not affect our conclusion, however,
that the combination of facts present here would make the DoD operation in Yemen part of the noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaida.”). For another articulation of a global NIAC, see generally Kenneth
Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether There is a ‘Legal
Geography of War,’ in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011).
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due to Arcadia’s determination that he is a legally targetable individual under
LOAC.
Franconia agrees to Arcadia’s request. Five days later Arcadia kills the
sub-commander with a missile fired from one of its armed unmanned aerial
vehicles. This takes place a few days before the sub-commander’s meeting with
the first arms dealer he was scheduled to meet.
Due to falling debris from a nearby building caused by the attack, a family
of three Franconians was killed. Arcadia knew of their presence and the risk
posed by falling debris, but determined, in accordance with the principle of
proportionality, that the three lost lives would be outweighed by the military
advantage gained by killing the sub-commander.
The far-reaching consequences of a global NIAC are obvious from this
scenario. As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) put it, such
a paradigm “would mean that the whole world is potentially a battlefield and
that people moving around the world could be legitimate targets under
international humanitarian law wherever they might be.”2 A global NIAC
permits a state to claim it is lawful to drop a bomb on an enemy fighter who
sits for a coffee in the middle of a peaceful city, say London, Rabat, or Hong
Kong. The global NIAC paradigm also permits the LOAC rules of
proportionality to apply. This would make permissible incidental civilian harm
and destruction of civilian property if it did not outweigh the military
advantage anticipated. A global NIAC would even permit the attacking state to
invite other states into its NIAC to carry out attacks on its behalf through the
doctrine of collective self-defense.
From a historical and political perspective, the notion of a global NIAC
brings to an end the view that war, as Yoram Dinstein put it, “would appear
every once in a while, leave death and devastation in its wake, and temporarily
pass away to return at a later date.”3 Instead, a global NIAC makes war
omnipresent and forever looming—both geographically and temporally. The
notion of a global NIAC has other consequences. It creates a “backdoor” that
allows Franconia to escape its human rights obligations. Take, for example, a
2

Interview with Peter Maurer, President of the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Use of Armed
Drones Must Comply with Laws (May 10, 2013), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/
2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.
3 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 76 (5th ed. 2012); see also Christof Heyns,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/68/382,
¶ 16 (Sept. 13, 2013).

HOROWITZ GALLEYSFINAL

2044

2/22/2016 1:37 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

situation where Franconia, which is not a party to a NIAC, wishes to kill
someone on its territory who is participating in a NIAC with Arcadia. Under
the rules of a global NIAC, Franconia could subvert its human rights
obligations by requesting Arcadia to carry out the killing. A global NIAC can
also put an attacking state in direct competition with the territorial state’s
domestic laws. If Franconia permitted an Arcadia agent to kill someone in a
manner that is unlawful under Franconia’s domestic law, that Arcadia agent
could be held criminally liable. Franconia agents involved in the operation
could also be exposed to criminal liability for allowing Arcadia to break its
domestic laws. Additionally, Franconia would be liable for allowing Arcadia to
breach its international human rights obligations.
These series of consequences are unsettling and require a serious evaluation
to determine if international law does in fact provide for a regime that permits
for such an expansive understanding of war. This is not to say that practitioners
and scholars have failed to put forward strong arguments that undercut claims
that global NIACs exist.4 But this Essay makes a contribution to this literature
by utilizing the public international law of interstate use of force, human rights,
and LOAC to uniquely demonstrate that the concept of a global NIAC cannot
be carried out in compliance with international law. This Essay reaches this
conclusion by focusing primarily on the international legal obligations of the
state in which the attack is occurring (e.g., the territorial state) rather than the
obligations of the attacking state.
Parts I, II, and III of this Essay set out in greater detail the public
international law of interstate use of force, human rights law, and LOAC. This
review is necessary for assessing, as is done in Part IV, their relationship to
one another. What can be concluded from this assessment is that a global
NIAC is not able to exist without there being a breach of international law. In
recognition of the needs of states to protect themselves and their populations

4 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks on Non-International Armed Conflicts, 88 INT’L L.
STUD. 399, 400 (2012); Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical
Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65, 87 (2013); Interview with Peter Maurer, supra note 2;
Rogier Bartels, Guest Post: Bartels–Temporal Scope of Application of IHL: When do Non-International
Armed Conflicts End? Part 1, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/02/18/guest-postbartels-temporal-scope-application-ihl-non-intrnational-armed-conflicts-end-part-1/;
Jelena
Pejic,
Extraterritorial Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications, INT’L COMMITTEE RED
CROSS (May 7, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jelena-pejic-extraterritorial-targeting-means-armeddrones-some-legal-implications; Gabor Rona, Debate (Round 1): The ‘Lutte’ Against Terrorism, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 30, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/1378/lutte-terrorism/.

HOROWITZ GALLEYSFINAL

2015]

2/22/2016 1:37 PM

REAFFIRMING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

2045

from attack, Part IV also describes ways that states can respond to attacks and
threats from non-state groups while complying with international law.
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSENT-BASED USE OF FORCE
In our assessment of the legality of a global NIAC under international law,
it is important to first consider under what circumstances a state is legally
permitted to use force in another state. The general rule is found in Article 2(4)
of the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), which requires states to refrain
from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”5 It follows that a lethal attack on one state’s
territory by another state engages Article 2(4).6
There are, however, three clear exceptions to Article 2(4). The first
exception is Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which is of limited concern to this
Essay. It permits the Security Council to sanction the use of force or other
measures when it makes a determination of the existence of a “threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”7 The second exception to
Article 2(4) is found in Article 51, which recognizes the inherent right that
states have to use force against another state in self-defense (including in
collective self-defense) of an armed attack.8 Article 51 is important to the
discussion of a global NIAC because it requires any state that uses force in the
name of the jus in bello to also consider whether that use of force is in
compliance with the separate rules of state sovereignty.9
5

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
The content of Article 2(4)—the prohibition on the use of force—has, by some, been regarded as a
peremptory norm (a rule jus cogens) and others as reflecting customary international law. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 392, at 615 (Nov. 26)
(dissenting opinion of Schwebel, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987); Oliver Dörr & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 231 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed., 2012). For additional discussion for and
against regarding Article 2(4) as reflecting a rule jus cogens, see generally James A. Green, Questioning the
Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215 (2011).
7 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41–42.
8 U.N. Charter art. 51.
9 See Lubell & Derejko, supra note 4, at 80; Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of
Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 17 (2014). See also Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen.
Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense, Speech at Yale Law School: National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering
in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/jeh-johnsons-speechnational-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-administration/p27448. This Essay does not address the
myriad of issues associated with Article 51, many of which have been covered in detail elsewhere. See, e.g.,
DINSTEIN, supra note 3; Dapo Akande & Thomas Liefländer, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and
6
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The third exception to Article 2(4), which is most important to this Essay,
is that international law permits an attacking state to use force on the territory
of another state when the territorial state provides its consent.10 Consent, when
considered in this context, has been said to effectively wash away the
sovereignty issues described above.11
Less discussed in the literature on consent, but relevant to examining the
legality of a global NIAC under international law, is the situation where the
territorial state consents to the attacking state’s wish to conduct LOAC
targeting operations when the territorial state is not in an armed conflict with
the attacking state’s targets. While the territorial state may be willing to grant
its consent, the question remains: what obligations and rights shape this
consent?
While the rules for operationalizing consent under international law are
largely unclear and what exists often lacks precision,12 general principles exist.
One is that the state is entitled to place limits on the consent it grants. This
reflects the core nature of sovereignty. A second principle is that the

Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2013); Ashley Deeks, Consent to the Use
of Force and International Law Supremacy, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 2, 33 (2013) [hereinafter Deeks, Consent to
the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy]; Dire Tladi, The Nonconsenting Innocent State: The
Problem with Bethlehem’s Principle 12, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 570 (2013).
10 For discussions on the role of consent-based military assistance in the context of armed conflict
interventions, see, for example, John Lawrence Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation and the Politics of the
New World Order, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori F. Damrosch & David J.
Scheffer eds., 1991); Rein Mullerson, Intervention by Invitation, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991); Eliav Lieblich, Intervention and
Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in Internal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 337 (2011); David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State
Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 209 (1996). See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (7th ed. 2008).
11 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/56/10/2001, art. 20 [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility]. This is not to
say intervention through consent is without its problems. There have been numerous examples where a foreign
state asserted that it gained consent on either false or very shaky grounds. See, e.g., Wippman, supra note 10,
at 211. For a discussion on specific rules that could be applied to giving and obtaining consent, see Deeks,
Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, supra note 9; Hargrove, supra note 10, at 116–
18.
12 Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, supra note 9, at 16 (“If
consent to the use of force remains a complicated proposition for scholars, it also remains one for states, which
have been imprecise or silent about their views.”); see also Hargrove, supra note 10, at 114–18. See generally
Mullerson, supra note 10.
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consenting state holds the right to withdraw its consent.13 A third general
principle is that states cannot enter into agreements that conflict with a
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).14
A fourth general principle that appears to apply to consent is that a state
may not allow another state to do what the consenting state is not permitted to
do.15 It is this last issue that goes to the question that the rest of this Essay will
address: Can the territorial state permit the attacking state to kill someone if the
territorial state is not allowed to kill that same person?
II. HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE
While it may be a foregone conclusion that a state may permit another state
to conduct activities on its territory, there remains the question of what other
sources of international law must the territorial state—which in our scenario is
not in an armed conflict with the targeted individual—take under consideration
when determining whether it should permit another state to carry out lethal
targeting operations on its soil.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
three major regional human rights treaties—the African Charter on Human and
13 Lieblich, supra note 10, at 374; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, opened for
signature, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 20.
14 For example, two states may never agree to form a “torture pact” or a “slavery pact” in which the
territorial state allows another state to commit acts of torture or slavery on its territory due to the jus cogens
status of the prohibitions against torture and slavery. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 53; Int’l
Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n on its Fifty-Eighth Session, Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N.
Doc A/CN.4/L.702, at 20–21, (July 18, 2006); Lieblich, supra note 10, at 364.
15 Hargrove, supra note 10, at 121; Ashley Deeks, Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Consent and
Obfuscation?, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/drone-strikes-in-pakistanconsent-and-obfuscation/. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, at 264 (Jun. 21) (dissenting opinion of Fitzmaurice, J.) (referring to “nemo dare potest
quod ipse non habet, or (the corollary) nemo accipere potest id quod ipse donator nunquam habuit” as an
“elementary yet fundamental principle of law” and an “incontestable legal principle”); see also Lighthouses
Case (Fr. v. Greece), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62, at 49–50 (Mar. 17) (separate opinion of Séfériadès, J.)
(referring to “[n]emo dat quod non habet” as a general principle of law); Situation in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, ICC-01/04-455, Judgment, ¶ 24 n.28 (Feb. 18, 2008) (“The OPCD refers to the principle of nemo
plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet (one may not transfer more legal rights than one has),
which is considered to be a general principle of international law.”); MAARTEN BOS, A METHODOLOGY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 73, 277 (1984); Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law
Supremacy, supra note 9, at 33 (“[I]nternational law should recognize consent as a legal basis for using force
only where a state’s consent authorizes actions the state itself could lawfully undertake.”).
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Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR)—all prohibit the unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of
life.16 Article 6 of the ICCPR reads, for example, “[e]very human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”17
All four treaties assign this right non-derogable status, which means there
are no circumstances in which the state may limit the right beyond the limits
that the treaty expressly states.18 These treaties and their case law also make it
clear that a territorial state has the responsibility to respect and protect the right
to life of an individual when that individual is located on its territory. There is,
therefore, little doubt that a state’s human rights obligations are engaged when
another state carries out a lethal targeting operation on its territory. What
exactly those obligations are is, however, a separate issue, which we will now
discuss.
A. “Unlawful” and “Arbitrary” Under Human Rights Law
Human rights law is adamant that the state must not be permitted to kill as
a general rule. But states were also adamant that human rights law needed to
16 While the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does
not use the term “arbitrary,” the European Court of Human Rights has routinely referred to a prohibition on
arbitrary deprivation of life.
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Language on the right to life can be
found in the following regional treaties: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 4, opened for
signature Jun. 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 58, 59, at 245 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986)
[hereinafter ACHPR] (“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his
life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.”); American Convention
on Human Rights art. 4, opened for signature Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 9 I.L.M. 99 (entered into
force Jul. 18, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR] (“Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall
be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.”); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
ECHR] (“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from
unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”).
18 See ACHR, supra note 17, art. 27; ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 4, ¶ 2. The ECHR permits “[n]o
derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.” ECHR, supra note
17, art. 15, ¶ 2. The ACHPR has no derogation clause, thus Article 4 cannot be derogated from.
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account for special exceptions. Two clear examples were the death penalty19
and—more relevant to this Essay—a state agent’s ability to use lethal force in
the name of self-defense or to protect others.20 As a result, human rights treaty
law does not prohibit all deprivation of life; it prohibits unlawful and arbitrary
deprivation of life. These terms make clear that a state must have in place
adequate regulations for when deprivation of life is permissible and that any
deprivation of life that takes place outside the law is prohibited.21
International human rights law also dictates that when force is used to take
a life, it must have been absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate.22 In
simplest terms, lethal targeting—that is to say, the suppression of an enemy
using lethal force as a means of first resort—is strictly prohibited under
international human rights law due, in large part, to the rules of necessity and
proportionality. Some of the clearest elaborations on these human rights rules
are found in the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (“Code
of Conduct”) and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms
by Law Enforcement Officials (“Basic Principles”). Both have the status of
soft law but have been regarded by human rights tribunals as providing
instructive interpretation.23 The Basic Principles explain the notion of necessity
this way:
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons
except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent
19 See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 17, art. 4, ¶¶ 2–6; ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 6, ¶¶ 2, 4–5. Both
conventions acknowledge the rights of states to impose the death penalty, but regulate its application.
20 See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 17, art. 2, ¶ 2.
21 For the ECtHR’s interpretation of “arbitrary,” see Şimşek and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 104
(2005) (“As the text of Article 2 itself shows, the use of lethal force by police officers may be justified in
certain circumstances. Nonetheless, Article 2 does not grant a carte blanche. It goes without saying that a
balance must be struck between the aim pursued and the means employed to achieve it. Unregulated and
arbitrary action by State officials is incompatible with effective respect for human rights. This means that, as
well as being authorised under national law, police operations must be sufficiently regulated by it, within the
framework of a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force.”)
(internal quotations omitted). For a discussion in the context of arbitrary detention¸ see Bozano v. France, Eur.
Ct. H.R., ¶ 54 (1986).
22 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 94 (2005). For summaries of European Court of
Human Rights case law on excessive use of force, see Factsheet–Right to Life, EUROPEAN CT. HUM. RTS.
(June 2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Life_ENG.pdf.
23 Gabriel Shumba v. Republic of Zimbabwe, Communication 288/2004, African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights [Af. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 136 (May 2, 2012) (the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights cited the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the United Nations Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials as “international jurisprudence”
that has “shed some light in the interpretation of the right to life”). See also Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, Eur.
Ct. H.R., ¶ 209 (2011); Şimşek and Others, supra note 21, ¶¶ 91–92.
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threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a
person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to
prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are
insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional
lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in
24
order to protect life.

The Basic Principles explain the proportionality requirement in this manner:
Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law
enforcement officials shall: (a) [e]xercise restraint in such use and act
in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate
objective to be achieved; (b) [m]inimize damage and injury, and
25
respect and preserve human life.

Notwithstanding the strict prohibitions on the deprivation of life, there are
exceptional moments when the prohibition must be reinterpreted through the
rules of a more specialized legal regime, namely in times of armed conflict
through LOAC. These rules are discussed below, but suffice it to say here that
while understandings of the relationship between human rights law and LOAC
are important for determining the international legal obligations of a state that
is party to an armed conflict, they are of limited relevance to this Essay since
the “clash” of human rights law and LOAC we are dealing with does not
pertain to the actions of a single state, but pertains to a clash of legal norms
between two states.
B. Scope of the Prohibition on the Unlawful and Arbitrary Deprivation of Life
The negative and positive obligations that human rights law place on states
is a second component of the prohibition on the unlawful and arbitrary
deprivation of life that is important to consider in our discussion of a global
NIAC. Negative obligations require the state to refrain from the commission of
human rights abuses against people on its territory. In simplest terms, the state
is prohibited from carrying out such acts as unlawful and arbitrary killings,
torture, rape, slavery, denial of due process, and other abuses. Positive
obligations meanwhile require the state to ensure, through legislative, judicial,
administrative, educative, and other appropriate measures, the protection of
individuals from human rights abuses, be it by the state, another state, or
24 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev. 1, art. 9 (Aug. 27, 1990).
25 Id. art. 5, ¶¶ a–b.
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private individuals or entities.26 For a finding of a positive obligation violation,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or “the Court”) said that the
state must have known or ought to have known “of the existence of a real and
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the
scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to
avoid that risk.”27 Relatedly, international human rights law prohibits a state to
consent to—effectively enabling—another state’s human rights abuses on its
territory. This was demonstrated in El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, where the ECtHR found Macedonia in violation of the ECHR for
permitting the United States to carry out torture and an illegal detention and
transfer on its territory.28 In that case the Court noted, a state “must be
regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign
officials on its territory with the acquiescence or connivance of its
authorities.”29
It is quite likely then that the Court would not only find a territorial state at
fault for permitting an unlawful and arbitrary killing by a foreign state to take
place on its territory, but it might also determine that the actual consent
agreement was itself a violation of the Convention. This is indicated by various
decisions that have found violations based on faulty regulatory systems and
operational planning that permitted, or at least failed to prevent, human rights
abuses. In McCann v. United Kingdom, for example, a case relating to the
United Kingdom’s use of lethal force against an alleged terrorist threat, the
Court outlined that a state’s obligations on the use of force applied not only to
when force is used, but also to pre-operation stages, noting that, “in
determining whether the force used was compatible with Article 2 (art. 2), the
Court must carefully scrutinize . . . whether the anti-terrorist operation was
planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest
extent possible, recourse to lethal force.”30 Similarly, in Giuliani and Gaggio v.
Italy, the ECtHR looked at Italy’s use of force regulatory system to determine
if there was an Article 2 violation: “The primary duty on the State to secure the
right to life entails, in particular, putting in place an appropriate legal and
administrative framework defining the limited circumstances in which law26

See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, ¶¶ 6–8 (Mar. 29, 2004).
27 Osman v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 (1998).
28 See El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 204 (2012).
29 Id. ¶ 206.
30 McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 194 (1995).
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enforcement officers may use force and firearms, in the light of the relevant
international standards.”31 Indeed, when viewed as part of a pre-operation
stage or as the regulatory system under which an attack was subject, a granting
of consent that allows a foreign state to kill as a means of first resort on a host
state’s territory would seem to run contrary to the Court’s jurisprudence on
how a state must secure the right to life.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TERRITORIAL STATE’S HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS AND LOAC
Whereas human rights law applies to states in times of peace and armed
conflict (and the times in between), LOAC targeting rules and privileges apply
only to a state that is engaged in an armed conflict.32 There are, generally
speaking, two legal classifications of armed conflict.33 One is international
armed conflict (IAC), which exists when two or more states are engaged in an
armed conflict with one another.34 There is also non-international armed
conflict, which takes place between a state actor (or actors) and a non-state
armed group (or groups), or between two or more non-state armed groups.
LOAC targeting rules and privileges immediately flow once an armed
conflict exists. A considerable amount of scholarly attention has been given to
the issue of what constitutes a NIAC and the nature of a NIAC’s geographic
scope. What is important to our discussion now is the fact that a state may only

31

Giuliani and Gaggio, supra note 23, ¶ 209.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 2, 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
2, 3, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, arts. 2, 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 2, 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Common
Article 2 and Common Article 3].
33 Despite there being two legal classifications of armed conflicts, all IACs and all NIACs are not the
same. For a discussion on armed conflict typologies, see, for example, Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed
Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 69 (2009).
34 With respect to the applicability of LOAC in international armed conflict, Common Article 2 states
that, “[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” Common Article 2, supra note
32. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also notes that the rules apply in “armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the
exercise of their right to self-determination.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1(4), Jun. 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
32
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consider using its LOAC targeting privileges against those fighters who are
engaged in that state’s armed conflict. This is true even when there are other
states involved in other armed conflicts all on the same territory.
A second aspect of LOAC that is important to our discussion is that LOAC
provides more permissible rules for how and when a state may kill compared
to “ordinary” human rights law. This is relevant to our discussion because it
reveals a significant tension between the territorial state’s human rights
obligations and the attacking state’s targeting privileges under LOAC. This
tension can be described as follows: A territorial state that is not a party to the
attacking state’s so-called global NIAC has obligations to prevent the arbitrary
deprivation of life as a matter strictly of human rights law, whereas the
attacking state is seeking the consent of the territorial state to take life under
the more permissible rules of LOAC.
The tension between the attacking state’s claim to LOAC targeting
privileges and the territorial state’s human rights obligations is largely a result
of LOAC having no principles of necessity and proportionality analogous to
those found in ordinary human rights law.35 LOAC, thus, does contain a rule of
necessity (commonly referred to as “military necessity”), but it relates to the
fighting force’s necessity to destroy its adversary. For example, under LOAC,
a military force may attack, with lethal force, a non-state fighter who is
planning to destroy the military’s communications towers while putting no
person’s safety directly or immediately at risk. Similarly, LOAC may permit
the killing of an enemy as they sleep in their barracks, something that ordinary
human rights law would never permit a state to do. This concept of “military
necessity,” when applied to armed conflict targeting rules, is radically
dissimilar to the concept of “necessity” under ordinary human rights law,
which is tested against an imminent risk to life or serious injury. As Corn
concluded, “armed conflict triggers authority to employ force in a manner that
would rarely (if ever) be tolerated in peacetime.”36
LOAC also has no analogous definition of proportionality as it exists under
ordinary human rights law. The rule of proportionality in LOAC—one of
LOAC’s core principles—is of an entirely different nature, one that regulates

35 Geoffrey F. Corn, Self-Defense Targeting: Blurring the Line Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in
Bello, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 57, 68 (2012) (“Like peacetime self-defense, jus ad bellum self-defense justifies a
State’s use of deadly military force only as a measure of last resort.”).
36 Id.
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the relationship between military advantage and incidental civilian harm.37
LOAC permits a degree of incidental harm to civilian and civilian property as a
consequence of an attack against a military objective. Thus, warring parties are
prohibited only from carrying out “an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated.”38 Ordinary human rights law, in
contrast, uses the term “proportionality” most often to regulate the amount of
force that can be used against the threat itself as well as to assess whether it
was justifiable for bystanders to be harmed.39
IV. THE LEGAL IMPERMISSIBILITY OF A “GLOBAL NIAC” AND LEGALLY
PERMISSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
A. The Impermissible Global NIAC
We will now turn to an evaluation of whether a global NIAC can be legally
permissible.
For the proponents of a global NIAC who believe that an attacking state
does not require the consent of the territorial state to target its enemy, this
Essay has shown that such a claim incorrectly places LOAC (and the attacking
state’s national interests) above one of the most basic principles of
international law, namely the prohibition on the use of force against another
state. A “no-consent global NIAC” is, therefore, directly at odds with the
requirement under international law that each time a state in a NIAC wishes to
cross an international border to use force anew it must press the proverbial
“start over” button and reassess the rules of applicable international law. This
requires the state to ask the question: Does the U.N. Security Council, the

37

See, e.g., id. at 70–72.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51(5)(b). This is an accepted rule of customary international
law in both NIACs and IACs. For supporting materials, see JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALDBECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, RULES 46–47 (2005).
39 See, e.g., Şimşek and Others, supra note 21, ¶ 108 (“The Court repeats that the use of force may be
justified under Article 2 § 2(c), in cases where the action is taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection. However in the instant case, the submissions of the applicants and the decision of the Trabzon
Assize Court show that, in order to disperse the crowd, officers shot directly at the demonstrators without first
having recourse to less life-threatening methods, such as tear gas, water cannons or rubber bullets. In this
connection, the Court observes that Turkish legislation allows police officers to use firearms only in limited
and special circumstances. However, it appears that this principle was not applied during the Gazi and
Ümraniye incidents.”).
38

HOROWITZ GALLEYSFINAL

2015]

REAFFIRMING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

2/22/2016 1:37 PM

2055

doctrine of self-defense, or the territorial state’s consent permit me to use
force? The wrong question to ask first is: Am I in an armed conflict?
Several scholars and experts have recognized the need for taking a holistic
approach to evaluating extraterritorial use of force. Michael Schmitt has noted
that “other bodies of international law may well limit where operations
attendant to such conflict may be conducted.”40 Sean Murphy also took into
consideration all relevant parts of international law when he assessed the
legality of U.S. operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan.41 Christof Heyns,
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
similarly agrees that a proper assessment of the lawfulness of extraterritorial
use of force can only be accomplished in such a holistic and comprehensive
manner.42
For those who believe that consent is required in a global NIAC, the
question then turns to whether international law permits the territorial state to
allow the attacking state to target an enemy who is (1) within the territorial
state’s borders and (2) is not in an armed conflict with the territorial state.
Dehn answered this question in the following manner: “The international
human rights obligations of a territorial state should be understood to place
constraints [on] the use of force by an attacking state, particularly when the
territorial state consents to the attacks but is not party to an armed conflict with
the relevant non-state actor.”43 Heyns has also added his voice to those who
recognize that human rights law may have limiting factors on a geographically
unconstrained application of LOAC.44

40 Schmitt, supra note 9, at 19. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Guest Post: A Step in the Wrong
Direction: The EU Parliament’s Drone Resolution, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 7, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/
7926/step-wrong-direction-eu-parliaments-drone-resolution-schmitt/.
41 See generally Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations
from Afghanistan into Pakistan, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 109 (2009).
42 Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 24; see also Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones, EUR. PARL. DOC. RSP
2567, ¶ E–F (Feb. 27, 2014) (“E. whereas drone strikes outside a declared war by a state on the territory of
another state without the consent of the latter or of the UN Security Council constitute a violation of
international law and of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that country; F. whereas international
human rights law prohibits arbitrary killings in any situation; whereas international humanitarian law does not
permit the targeted killing of persons who are located in non-belligerent states.”).
43 John C. Dehn, Targeted Killing, Human Rights and Ungoverned Spaces: Considering Territorial
States Human Rights Obligations, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 84, 90 (2012). For a similar discussion on the
relationship between human rights obligations and consent, see generally Rijie Ernie Gao, Between a Rock and
a Hard Place: Tensions Between the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement and the Duty to Ensure Individual
Rights Under the ICCPR, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 585, 590 (2009).
44 Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 38.
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These conclusions, in the author’s view, give proper deference to the
territorial state’s human rights obligations when it is not a party to the same
armed conflict as the attacking state. The conclusions are also in keeping with
the legal principle that one may not transfer more legal rights than one has.45
Under this principle a territorial state (Franconia) cannot permit the attacking
state (Arcadia) to target an individual whom the territorial state is not in an
armed conflict with. Whereas Arcadia may claim that it can rely on LOAC
rules because it is in an armed conflict with its target, Franconia cannot make a
similar claim because it is in no such armed conflict with that same target.
Franconia does not have the legal authority to permit Arcadia to conduct
LOAC targeting operations on its territory because Franconia has no LOAC
rights to “give away.”
In assessing the relationship between the attacking state’s claim to LOAC
targeting privileges and the territorial state’s obligations under human rights
law, it is also important to recall that we are being presented with a
competition between those things that a state claims it has the authority to do,
and those things that a state is required to do. LOAC grants a state the
permission to target its enemies, but it leaves it up to the state to choose
whether it wants to do so or not. To put it bluntly, LOAC does not require a
state at war to kill. It merely allows it to do so. Laurie Blank points out,
“[m]ilitary necessity is . . . a principle of authority: the authority to use force to
accomplish strategic and national security goals.”46 This is in contrast to
human rights law, which requires the state to respect the prohibition on the
arbitrary deprivation of life. This includes the negative obligation not to carry
out an arbitrary deprivation of life and the positive obligation to prevent an
arbitrary deprivation of life. In determining the relationship between privileges
and obligations, it would seem logical that it is the obligations that take
priority, however unfortunate that may be for the attacking state.47
B. Issues of Normative Conflict
All this being said, is not uncommon for a single state to enter into
competing legal agreements. In the case before us, these competing legal
45

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Laurie R. Blank, Debates and Dichotomies: Exploring the Presumptions Underlying Contentions
About the Geography of Armed Conflict, 16 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 297, 305 (2013).
47 For a discussion on how this issue is resolved in a single-state scenario, see Marko Milanović, Norm
Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69, 72 (2009). See also
Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 451 (1953).
46
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agreements (the territorial state’s human rights treaty and its subsequent
bilateral agreement with the attacking state) give rise to an apparent norm
conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to consider what international law says
about such situations.48
As noted above, states cannot enter into agreements that violate peremptory
norms, which would include such human rights violations as torture and
slavery. Additionally, Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), which addresses agreements that states can make to modify
multilateral treaties between certain but not all parties, does not pertain to the
modification of “a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.”49
Certainly, the protections afforded to the non-derogable right to life in
international and regional human rights treaties would appear to be a major
component of the object and purpose of regional and international human
rights treaties.50 Therefore, a state party to the ICCPR could not opt out of its
Article 6 obligations in order to enter into an agreement that allows a foreign
state to kill someone on its territory.
Human rights obligations are afforded special protection in other ways.
Agreements with a humanitarian character receive special protections under
Article 60 of the VCLT that guard them from being terminated by a bilateral
agreement that is not of a humanitarian character.51 The Human Rights
Committee also has found situations where the ICCPR prevails when a state

48 This topic has received significant scholarly and judicial attention. See, e.g., 1 THE VIENNA
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 774–75 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011);
Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation
of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615, 618 (2009); Jenks, supra note 47, at 451–52; Ralf Michaels &
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public
International Law, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 351–52 (2012); Milanović, supra note 47.
49 Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 41.
50 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24, Issues Relating to Reservations Made
upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, ¶ 10 (1994) (explaining
that a reservation to the prohibition on the right to life would offend against the object and purpose of the
Covenant both because of its non-derogable status and its status as a peremptory norm).
51 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Article 30 (1969), in 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 793 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011 ed.). See also Thomas Giegerich,
Article 60. Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty as a Consequence of its Breach, in THE
VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1045–47 (Oliver D rr
Kirsten
Schmalenbach eds., 2012 ed.).
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finds itself in a situation of conflicting norms.52 The ECtHR has taken a similar
approach when the issue has arisen with respect to extradition agreements
between states53 and state agreements with international organizations.54 A
consequence—indeed the purpose—of the Court’s rulings on this issue was to
ensure that states did not evade their ECHR responsibilities by allowing
another entity do what the consenting state itself was prohibited from doing.55
What can be concluded from the above is that public international law may
not resolve in its entirety the problem of conflicting international norms, but
there appears to be a strong resistance, reflected through the content of the
VCLT and judicial practice, that states that enter into agreements that conflict
with their human rights treaty obligations, be it through their own actions or
through the powers they bestow upon others, can be found to be in breach of
those human rights obligations. If this is the case, then a bilateral agreement
that allows the attacking state to carryout LOAC targeting would not invalidate
the territorial state’s human rights obligations, nor would priority be given to
the bilateral agreement. Instead, the territorial state’s consent to the LOAC
operation would be a violation of its human rights obligations if the territorial
state were not in an armed conflict with the targeted individual. It is therefore
hard to imagine how a global NIAC can be made permissible under
international law if the territorial state’s consent is necessarily a breach of its
obligations under international human rights law.
C. Legally Permissible Alternatives
This Essay, while concluding that a consent-based global NIAC is made
impermissible under international law by the territorial state’s human rights
obligations, does not seek to challenge other rules under international law that
52

Kindler v. Canada, CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, View Concerning Communication No. 470/1991, ¶¶
13.1–2 (Human Rights Comm. Nov. 11, 1993).
53 See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989).
54 See generally Matthews v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999). Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 128 (2010) (“[T]he obligation under Article 3 of the Convention not to surrender a
fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment was held to override the United
Kingdom’s obligations under the Extradition Treaty it had concluded with the United States in 1972.”).
55 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 154 (2005).
Antonios Tzanakopoulos noted that this type of argumentation “could be seen as an implementation of the
maxim nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet. One may not circumvent limitations on the exercise
of power by conferring the power to someone else.” Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Kadi and the Solange Argument
in International Law, EJIL: TALK! BLOG (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/kadi-and-the-solangeargument-in-international-law-2/.
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permit a state to defend itself from a non-state group acting abroad. It is quite
possible, in fact, that many of the actions that a state may wish to undertake
under the banner of a global NIAC could be taken through other legally
permissible use-of-force frameworks.
The distinction between using a legally permissible framework or a legally
impermissible framework is critically important even if the material difference
is negligible. This is because the concept of a global NIAC stands for
something far greater than the consequences of any single lethal attack or
group of lethal attacks that a state may wish to carry out. A global NIAC, if it
were to be legally permissible, would permit a state to engage in a neverending war in which human rights law would be sidelined and the more
permissible LOAC targeting rules would be routinely applied without
geographic constraint. What comes with this is a legal framework that
dramatically expands a state’s use of force beyond what international law had
envisaged to date. This is most acutely seen by the global NIAC’s assertion
that LOAC rules can apply nearly everywhere, despite their generally intended
use for scenarios where a state is under such threat, that the normal machinery
of law enforcement and due process guarantees is not enough to defeat a wellorganized enemy that has the resources and capabilities to jeopardize the
security of the state.
To better illustrate alternatives to a global NIAC, below are several legal
avenues permissible under international law that states may use to defend
themselves from violent non-state groups:
 Territorial State Action. The attacking state, instead of carrying out an
operation, may ask the territorial state to take action. This has to be done
within the confines of the law, and might result in, inter alia, the territorial
state detaining, arresting, prosecuting, or extraditing the targeted individual. In
exceptional circumstances, the use of force, including lethal force, may result
lawfully when done proportionately and out of necessity, as those terms are
defined under human rights law. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that
situations could arise where the territorial state could derogate from its human
rights treaty obligations, thereby allowing it to carry out a more “robust” law
enforcement operation. But such derogation can be made only in so far as the
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derogation is within the bounds of what is permissible under relevant
international law.56
 Consent-Based Armed Conflict. In instances where the territorial state is
engaged in a NIAC with the same individual(s) who the foreign state wishes to
target, the territorial state may request the foreign state to join its armed
conflict. The territorial state may also accept offers of a foreign state’s armed
support to the armed conflict. Under these conditions, the foreign state may
find itself becoming a party to the territorial state’s armed conflict and,
implicitly, be permitted to rely on LOAC targeting rules.
 Inherent Right to Self-Defense. Some have argued that a state that is the
object of an armed attack by a non-state group may claim an inherent right to
self-defense. This right would exist regardless of the territorial state’s consent.
Important to the invocation of self-defense, but not discussed in this Essay, is
both a consideration of what constitutes an “armed attack” and what amount
and type of force is permitted when a claim of self-defense is made.57
 U.N. Security Council Authorization. An attacking state may seek and
obtain Security Council authorization to respond with force to an armed attack
by a non-state group.58
 “Law Enforcement” Consent. A territorial state may allow another state to
use force on its territory provided that the consent only permits the attacking
state to operate within the confines of the law, in particular, international
human rights law. To do this, the consent agreement must, amongst a myriad
of issues, recognize that there is a prioritization of capture over kill and,
therefore, the consent agreement would necessarily have to include a detailed
detention scheme. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that situations could
arise where the territorial state could derogate from its human rights treaty

56 See generally A. and Others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 173–90 (2009); Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶ 1
(2001).
57 The author recognizes that there is debate over whether a state can invoke a right to self-defense under
Article 51 in response to an attack by a non-state group. The U.N. Security Council seems to have determined
that it can, having passed resolutions that recognize the right to self-defense in the context of non-state terrorist
attacks. See S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl (Sept. 12, 2001) (“Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence in accordance with the Charter”). See also S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl (Sept. 28, 2001) (“Reaffirming
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as
reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001).”). For further discussion, see John Cerone, Misplaced Reliance on the
“Law of War,” 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 59–60 (2007).
58 DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 308.
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obligations, thereby allowing the territorial state to permit the attacking state to
conduct a more “robust” law enforcement operation. But such derogations can
be made only in so far as the derogation is within the bounds of what is
permissible under relevant international law.59
 Emergence of Armed Conflict. It is conceivable that any of the scenarios
above could develop into a NIAC where the full breadth of applicable LOAC
comes into force (alongside applicable international human rights law). For
this to occur the threshold for a NIAC would have to be reached and LOAC’s
permissive targeting rules would then apply between the relevant parties and
individuals.
CONCLUSION
This Essay analyzes the public international law of interstate use of force,
human rights law, and LOAC to demonstrate that the concept of a global
NIAC cannot exist without there being a violation of international law.
Notably, the violation that this Essay focuses on is that of the territorial state
rather than the attacking state. As demonstrated, human rights law creates a
legal barrier that prevents LOAC from jumping from one state to another,
which is the defining characteristic of a global NIAC. This does not mean, as
this Essay explains, that states cannot respond to attacks and threats from nonstate groups while complying with international law. It means that advocates of
a global NIAC must use other sources of international law to justify the
extraterritorial use of force that they think a global NIAC makes legally
possible.
Whether states will take such action to render the concept of a global NIAC
extinct is a different matter. It would require nothing less than the territorial
state respecting its human rights obligations and asserting its sovereignty
within the extremely politicized and highly insecure sphere of terrorism,
counterterrorism, and armed conflict. This is a particularly tall order for a
territorial state when the request comes from an attacking state that has
considerable military, political, and economic resources to provide or
withhold. To ensure the territorial state complies with international law will
require a sustained focus and intensified discussions on the legal obligations of
the territorial state and will have to include holding the territorial state
accountable for its breach of international law. It is equally important that
59

See generally supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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territorial states and attacking states utilize and strengthen the various lawful
means outlined in this Essay to address non-state actors. Not to do so threatens
to make the global NIAC the default framework that states use to address the
real (and sometimes not so real) threats that non-state actors pose.

